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THE VANISHING HARBERGER TRIANGLE
A9ST1ACT
Thepaper presents a trapped equity model, but instead of studying how taxes affect
corporate decisions when a sufficient amount of equity is already in the trap, it asks the
question how does the equity get there. To be more specific, the paper analyzes how the
double taxation of dividends affects the growth of a corporation that starts with no equity
capital. One conclusion is that dividend taxes are distortionary before they are paid, but
not when they are paid. Once the firm is in a stage of maturity where it pays dividends and
dividend taxes, tax neutrality prevails. Thus the true intersectoral distortion resulting from
corporate taxation is negatively correlated with the measured tax burden, and it is lower,
the higher the distortion which estimates of Harberger type would predict. Another
conclusion is that the King—Fullerton cost of capital formulae are not applicable in the case
of immature firms. These formulae are based on the assumption that firms distribute their
profits from marginal investment projects as dividends. However, immature firms strictly
prefer a reinvestment to a distribution of profits. The reinvestment changes the cost of
equity capital, and typically this cost is higher than a hasty application of the






West Germany1. The Problem
The roots of modern tax theory lie in Harberger's (1962, 1966) problem of how the
double taxation of corporate dividends affects the allocation of resources between the
corporate and non—corporate sectors of the economy. Harberger's claim was that the
double taxation of dividends discriminates against corporate investment and creates
welfare losses by keeping too large a share of the economy's capital stock in the
non—corporate sector. The larger the tax burden on dividends, the bigger the welfare loss
that results.
This paper reconsiders Harberger's problem from an intertemporal
perspective. It studies the foundation and growth of corporations in the presence of
dividend taxation to find out whether, and if so, under what circumstances dividend
taxes create a Harberger—type distortion. The main result is that the distortion is a
transitory phenomenon and that, in an important sense, the size of the welfare loss is
negatively rather than positively related to the size of the tax burden.
The traditional view of corporate taxation as formulated by Harberger has
recently been questioned by holders of the so—called "new" or "trapped equity" view of
corporate taxation, including, for example, King (1974a, 1974b, 1977), Bradford (1980,
1981), Auerbach (1979, 1983), King/Fullerton (1984), and Sinn (1987). Their argument
is that the dividend tax is capitalized in share prices and therefore cannot affect the
firm's investment decisions. The tax is simply seen as a lump sum levy on corporations.
If true, tax reforms, whose aim is to remove the double taxation of dividends, would be
superfluous. They would create windfall gains for the current owners of corporate shares,
but would not improve the allocation of resources.
Unfortunately, however, the new view does not seem fully compatible with
the empirical facts. As observed by Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985), who studied the
effects of British tax reforms, changes in the statutory dividend tax rate did have
adverse effects on the level of aggregate investment. Poterba and Summers attributed
their findings to the fact that the trapped equity model neglects the signalling function2
of dividends. While this is a possible explanation for the non—neutrality of dividend
taxation, there are others. The one explored in this paper is suggested by a serious
shortcoming of the trapped equity model.
Existing approaches that use this model have the common characteristic
that they do not explain how equity fails into the trap. Typically, it is assumed that the
firm already has more than the efficient amount of equity capital at the time the
investment decision is analyzed. Under these circumstances, the neutrality proposition is
not especially surprising. It just means that the firm retains the efficient amount of
equity and distributes the remainder. The important problems of how much equity
capital shareholder may wish to inject into their firms in the first place and whether the
corporate stock of capital will ever reach its efficient size are unsolved.
This paper offers a solution that is consistent with Poterba and Summers's
findings. It reconsiders Harberger's problem from the viewpoint of a trapped equity
model, but one that starts with the process of injecting capital into the firm.
Surprisingly, no similar model seems to exist in the literature. It is true that holders of
the trapped equity view typically concede that dividend taxes are distortionary to the
extent that new issues of shares are a marginal source of finance. However, as far as is
known, no attempt has been made to formulate an explicit intertemporal model that
describes the foundation and growth of a corporation in the presence of dividend
taxation.
The paper rehabilitates Harberger's view that the dividend tax
discriminates against corporate investment, but, in addition, it modifies and criticizes
his analysis. Harberger and many of his followers have concentrated on the general
equilibrium repercussions of taxation and have placed little emphasis on microeconomic
considerations such as how taxes would affect the investment decisions of the firm.
Frequently they have simply assumed that the corporate firm invests until the
net—of—tax maiginal product of capital equals the market rate of interest. This
assumption is compatible with partial optimization given that new share issues are the
only marginal source of finance and that all profits resulting from an investment are
distributed as dividends. However, there are at least two problems with this.3
The first is that, instead of new share issues, the firm may choose other
sources of finance. From an empirical point of view, both debt and retained profits are
cheaper and much more important sources than new issues of shares. The holders of the
new view have emphasized this and have derived investment conditions that typically
imply lower distortions than those Harberger argued for.
The second problem is that, instead of using the profits from its marginal
investment to pay dividends to shareholders, the firm may choose other uses for profits.
One possibility is share repurchases. Profit financed share repurchases can be seen as a
way of avoiding the double taxation of dividends and they undermine Harberger's results
for obvious reasons. A second potential use for profits is internal investment. This is not
only of great empirical significance in all countries, it is also suggested by theoretical
considerations. In fact, it is clear that a firm would not distribute its profits immediately
after it has issued new shares if, as Harberger claimed, the shares stopped being issued
before the point where the marginal product of capital equals the market rate of interest.
With an internal rate of return above the shareholders' discount rate, it would always
pay to reinvest the profits and distribute them later. The present value of dividends, net
of the dividend taxes, could be increased by postponing the distributions for as long as it
takes for the process of reinvesting profits to equate the marginal product of capital and
the market rate of interest. This suggests that there might be something wrong with the
reasoning underlying the Harberger—type cost—of—capital formula even if it is assumed
that the firm is forced by an initial shortage of retainable profits to issue new shares at
the margin, cannot borrow, and cannot escape the dividend tax by repurchasing its
shares.
The reinvestment of the profits generated by marginal investment projects
is incompatible not only with Harberger's formula, but renders some of the formulae
provided by holders of the new view also inapplicable. For example, the popular cost of
capital formula of Fullerton and King (1984), 'ihich is a weighted average of the costs of
the three alternative sources of finance, assumes that the profits from marginal
investment projects are distributed. King's (1977) expressions for the cost of new share
issues and retained profits, which enter this formula, are not applicable when the returns4
from marginal investment projects are reinvested at a rate of return above the market
rate of interest. Section 2.5 will discuss the relationship to the cost of capital formulae
provided by the holders of the new view in more detail.
Except for the exclusion of debt financing and profit financed share
repurchases, the present paper makes no assumptions about the firm's source of funds
for, and the use of the profits generated by, marginal investment projects. Instead, the
financial and real investment decisions are endogenously derived from the firm's
optimization approach. The available sources of funds are new share issues and retained
profits, and the possible uses for profits are dividends and internal investment. The
exclusion of debt financing and profit financed share repurchases is motivated by the
attempt to treat one difficulty at a time and to follow Harberger's analysis as closely as
possible. Including these possibilities would weaken his case and imply a criticism of his
other results than the one made here.1
Essentially, the paper is a reconsideration of Harberger's problem, asking
his questions and using his assumptions. It formulates an intertemporal variant of his
two sector model, which is based on microeconomic optimization rather than arbitrarily
postulated marginal conditions. This variant is slightly more complicated than the
original model but it nevertheless reflects the attempt to be as simple as possible
without giving up the rigor necessary to make the point. The economy has a given stock
of capital for which two representative firms compete in a perfect capital market. The
firms produce the same commodity, use only equity capital, and please their far—sighted
owners by choosing the investment policies which maximize their market values. One of
the firms is corporate, the other non—corporate. The trapped equity property is modeled
by the assumption that the government does not contribute to funds shareholders inject
into the firm, but taxes all payments to shareholders that result from current or previous
profits. A tax exempt return of the original capital is allowed.2
IA critical discussion of the Harberger approach that allows for debt financing and other
modifications of his assumptions can be found in Sinn (1987, ch. 6).
2The paper should not be seen as an attempt to solve the dividend puzzle. See Poterba
(1987) for an excellent discussion of this puzzle.5
2. Dividend Taxation and the Growth of the Corporation
Before the Harberger problem can be meaningfully discussed, a model of the firm is
needed that explains how a corporate firm is set up and how the equity capital falls into
the trap. This section provides one. The next section will add an untaxed firm and
analyze the properties of capital market equilibrium.
2.1. A Model of the Firm
The firm's policy is determined by its shareholders who, in line with Fisher's separation
theorem, unanimously agree to maximize the initial market value of shares net of the
original capital injected. Let tj be the point in time t at which the firm's planning
problem starts. Shareholders are price takers, look through the corporate veil, and are
endowed with perfect foresight of all variables of the model. They can borrow and lend
at the going market rate of interest r, r> 0, whose time path they take as exogenously
given. The market value of shares is therefore implicitly determined by the following
arbitrage condition that requires shareholders to be indifferent between keeping their
wealth in the form of bonds or shares:
(1) rM=eD-4-thz+(m-Q) fort>t1.
The lefthand side of (1) is the return from seffing the existing stock of shares at its
market value M and investing the funds received in bonds which yield the market rate of
interest r. The righthand side of (1) measures the current return from continued
shareholding. D is the gross dividend and e1—ris one minus the dividend tax rate. It
is assumed that 0 <e<1 and that eisa constant.3 The next term, hz, is the capital
3See Howitt and Sinn (1986) for an analysis of anticipated changes of the dividend tax
rate in a trapped equity model with debt financing.6
gain from existing shares where m is the price of a share and z the number of
outstanding shares. The term in round brackets is the value of purchasing options for
new shares issued to the existing shareholders. It is the difference between the market
value of the new shares, m, and the flow of funds Q that must be paid to the firm in
exchange for the shares. When there are no purchasing options (as in the U.S., for
example) it can be assumed that m =Qas existing shareholders will not vote for a
policy of diluting their shares. In general, however, there is no need to assume that im
and Q are linked to one another.
Noting that thz + m =!f,(1) can be transformed to i1f =— eD+ Q + i'M
which, upon integration, gives
(2) M(t) =f[D() -Q(v)Jexpf- r(u)du dv for t ￿ ti
plussome arbitrary constant. The constant is taken to be zero to ensure that the market
value of a firm that promises never to issue new shares and never to distributeany
dividends is zero. It is assumed for the derivation of (2) that the integral exists which
requires that limg* [eD(t*) —Q('f*)]expftx_ r('u)du=0
Following Harberger, it is assumed that the firm produces its output only
with equity capital K. Moreover, with only small losses in generality, all commodity
prices are assumed constant and normalized to unity. Under these assumptions, the
firm's revenue, profit, and output can all be described by the function f(K) satisfying the
usual properties f'> 0, f"< 0, f'(O) =, f'('c)=0.The dividend the firm can pay is
(3) D=f(K)-k+Q,7
where k is the firm'8 net investment. Let )(o be the stock of capital available from the
firm's past history and K1 the stock of equity capital reached at t1 after the initial issue
of shares.
Then, the firm's problem can be expressed as






where K is the state variable and k, Q, and K1 are the controls. The three constraints
implicitly capture the trapped equity assumption that the government participates in
corporate distributions but not in what shareholders inject into their corporation. For
the time being, the trapped equity assumption is made in the extreme form that it is
impossible for the firm to pay cash to its shareholders that is not taxed as dividends; i.e.,
that Q> 0 for all K ￿ 0. This assumption will be relaxed in section 4 to allow the firm
to return its original share capital. A similar remark applies to the assumption K0 =0.
2.2. The Optirnality Cotidition.s
The problem of the firm can be solved by using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. Using
(3) and associating a co—state variable q (Tobin's q) with K and Kuhn—Tucker
multipliers andwith the flow constraints, the current value Hamiltonian of
problem (4) can be written as:
J1=(e+)[f(K)_k+Q]+qic_ Q(l-).
Froma'ok =0it follows that8
(5)
and from OJ/OQ =0 that
(6)
Both equations together imply:
(7) =ltLQ -
Becauseof (5), the canonical equation —rq=— OJI/OKcan be transformed to
(8) f1(K)+f=r.
The Kuhn—Tucker conditions of the problem are
(9) Q=0 $LQ￿O
(10) D=0, ￿O,
The firm's starting condition is OM(t1)/8K1 —1=0which, as 3M(t)/OK(t) ! q(t) holds
by definition, implies that
(11) q(ti)= 1
Finally, the transversality condition is
t
(12) limt,a, q('t)K('t) expf— r(v)dv =0
tl9
Notice that, because of (6), (9), and (10), the firm cannot simultaneously
issue new shares and pay dividends. Instead, at any point in time after t1, it must either
be the case that (Q>0; D==0) that (Q=D=0;, ￿0),or that
(Q= = 0;D>0).Together with the initial condition, this implies that the following
activity phases are available. The names of these phases anticipate properties yet to be
derived.
Phase Ia(K1 ￿ 0;t =t1)
Phase Ia refers to the starting point where the original stock of equity K1maybe
injected. According to (11), this phase is characterized by
q(ti) =1
Phase Ib(Q> 0; D==0;t> t1)
Phase lb is a phase of continuing equity injections after the time of foundation. During
this phase,=0and hence (7) implies that
q=1,q=0.
Ittherefore follows from (8) that
(13) r=f'(K).
Phasell(Q=D=0;Il.Q￿0;t>t1)




Phase III (D>O; Q==0; t> t1)
For a firm that pays dividends, (5) and =0indicate that
q=O, q=0
which, because of (8), implies that
(16) f'(K)=r.
2.3. The Optimal Growth Path
The optimal growth path of the firm is a combination of the four phases that satisfies
the the transversality condition (12) and the Maximum Principle's general requirement
that there be no jumps in the state and co—state variables. Assuming for the time being
that the market rate of interest is a positive constant4 for t ￿ t1, the growth path can be
uniquely determined in (q,K) space as illustrated in Figure 1.
The position of the vertical line in this diagram characterizes the equity
level K2 implicitly defined by the laissez—faire condition f'(K2) =r.During Phase III,
the firm is on this vertical line at q =e. Itdistributes all its profits since K =Q = 0
and it can stay in this phase forever since the transversality condition (12) is satisfied.
Phase III is the phase on which the new view of corporate taxation
concentrates. The shadow price of equity, q, is eratherthan one, since eisthe
shareholders' net dividend foregone if the firm decides to retain and invest one additional
unit of profit. The low value of the shadow price just compensates for the tax on the
41n the next section, this assumption will be relaxed and the time path of r will be
endogenously determined by the conditions of a market equilibrium.11
returns which an additional unit of equity capital will generate and explains why, despite
the tax, the firm follows the laissez—faire investment rule f'(K) =r.Let t2 be the point
in time at which Phase UI begins.
q I
f'>rf'<r :
Figure1: The optimal growth path under the dividend taz
Clearly, Phase III cannot be a starting phase. The firm first has to raise
enough equity capital to get there. A potential candidate for explaining how to reach
Phase UI is Phase II, for the two differential equations (14) and (15) define a set of
possible paths in (q,K) space one of which intersects the vertical at q =e. Theslope of
these paths is given by
(17) dq/dK= q/K= q[r—f'(K)]/f(K) (Phase II).
As f "<0and K> 0 for K> 0, the slope is negative in the region to the left of the
vertical, zero on the vertical, and positive in the region to the right of it. The arrows in
Figure 1 indicate the possible movements. Assuming that the production elasticity of K12
is bounded away from unity, it is shown in the appendix that the ordinate is an
asymptote for all paths:
q(K)— forK—+O (Phasell).
This property ensures that the path leading to the steady state point (e,K2) intersects
the horizontal line of height q =1at some strictly positive value of K; call this value
K1 .
Noticethat Phase H cannot be a final phase. If it were, the firm would
never again pay dividends. Yet it is clear from (2) that this cannot be an optimum since,
at any point in time t during this phase and given the then available stock of equity
K(t*), the firm could increase its market value M(t*) by paying out all future profits as
dividends and keeping the stock of equity constant. The existence of such a possibility
would violate the Bellman Principle on which the Maximum Principle is built.
Neither can Phase II be an initial phase. Starting with Phase II means
starting with an infinite value of q. Given the possibility of injecting equity capital at a
price of unity from outside the firm, this cannot be optimal.
Potential candidates for an initial phase are Phases Ia and lb. It can easily
be seen, however, that Phase lb does not exist. During Phase Ib, q =1and the firm
issues new shares without distributing any dividends. In the diagram, this means that
there is a horizontal movement to the right (k> 0) with q being kept constant at the
level of unity. Such a horizontal movement clearly implies that condition (13) cannot be
met, for this condition and the assumption i =0imply that k =i/f"=0.The firm
would have to satisfy the laissez faire condition f' =r, ifit continued o issue new
shares, but it cannot.
Thus, only Phase Ia remains. Like Phase Ib, Phase Ia requires that q =1.
However, since this phase merely refers to the starting point t =t1,the flow condition
(13) is not required. The firm issues a sufficient number of shares to reach the Phase—Il
path in one step when it is founded: K1 =K1*.Because of the non—existence of Phase Ib,13
the subscript "a" is dropped in the remainder of this paper and all references to Phase I
are meant to refer to Phase Ia.
With Phase I as the necessary starting phase and Phase IH as the only
available final one, the question is whether Phase II is needed at all. It might be
tempting to believe that the optimal strategy involves issuing enough shares to reach K2
during Phase I and then to start with Phase III (t2 =t1).However, such a direct move
between the two phases would require a forbidden jump in the co—state variable q from 1
to e.PhaseH therefore is a necessary link between Phase I and Phase III, and the only
continuous transition between the phases is one that satisfies the following pattern.
During Phase I, q =1and new shares are issued until the desired stock of original
capital K1 is reached. Then the firm drifts along the curved Phase—Il path towards the
steady state point (q =e, K=K2)accumulating a surplus reserve of amount K2 —K1.
Once there (t =t2),it is in Phase III and stays there forever.
It is important to realize that, unlike many other intertemporal models,
the steady state is reached in finite time. As Q =D=0during Phase II, it follows from
(3) that the increase in K per period is positive and bounded away from zero, and, in
fact, even the speed of increase is increasing:
k(t) =f[K(t)]￿f(K2)> 0,
k(t) =f'[K(t)]k(t)>Ofor all t1 <t￿ t2 (Phase II)
This clearly implies that t2 <i.e., that the steady state stock of surplus reserves
K2 —K1is accumulated in finite time.
The following proposition summarizes these findings. It describes the
optimal growth path of a corporation that is subject to dividend taxation.
Propo€ition 1: When the firm is founded, new shares are issued to generate some equity to
start with. The starting stock is smaller than the one at which the marginal product of
capital equals the market rate of interest. After the foundation, a phase of internal growth
follows during which the firm neither issues new shares nor distributes any pro fits. This
phase terminates in finite time when sufficient surplus reserves have been accumulated to
equate the marginal product of capital with the market rate of interest. The firm will then
stop growing, issue no share,, and distribute all it.s profits.14
While Proposition 1 refers to the qualitative aspects of the growth path
when there is a dividend tax, it does not clarify the role of the dividend tax itself. To
understand this role, note that the size of the dividend tax rate neither affects the initial
value of q, nor the set of Period—IT paths compatible with (14) and (15), nor the steady
state value of equity, K2. The only thing that is affected is the steady state value of
q(t2) =0.This value singles out the optimal path during Period II and determines both
the length of this period and the size of the original capital K1. Obviously, the higher T,
the lower 0 and q, the lower K1, and the longer the time span that must elapse before
the missing amount of surplus reserves "2 —K1 is accumulated. When there is no
dividend tax, then q(t2) =q(ti)=1,and Phase II is not needed to avoid a jump in q.
Shareholders inject a sufficient amount of original capital to reach the steady state value
K2 in one step.
Again, this is summarized in a proposition.
Proposition 2: The phase of internal growth is longer and the starting stock of equity
smaller the higher the tax rate on dividends. Without the dividend tax, there i3 no such
phase. AU equity is then generated through share issues when the firm is founded.
2.4. The Nucleus Theory of the Corporation
While Propositions 1 and 2 are meant to prepare the ground for a discussion of the
Harberger problem, they may be interesting in their own right. They show that the
policy of maximizing the rate of internal growth and minimizing dividend payments that
has been so graphically described by Penrose (1959) and others does not have to be
explained by a divergence between manager and shareholder interests. The high burden
of dividend taxes can also be an explanation. It is particularly reaffirming in this context
to hear what Barlow/Wender (1955, ch. 11) and Penrose (1956, pp. 227—229) say about
the growth of foreign affiliates of U.S. ..corporations. The typical pattern of growth these
authors observed was that, when founded, the affiliates were given only a nucleus of
equity capital and then had to grow by themselves. Only mature affiliates that had
reached their desired size were expected to distribute profits. In the light of the fact that15
border crossing profit distributions are frequently subject to international double and
triple taxation, this observation is not at all surprising.5
A further observation involves the relatively infrequent occurrence of new
share issues that has been observed by many authors. For example, in the period from
1980 to 1985, on average 67.8 % of gross investment by U.S. non—financial corporations
was internally financed and 31.0 % was debt financed, but only 1.2 % was financed by
share issues.6 The actual figures may be somewhat different for other countries, but their
tendency dearly describes a general empirical phenomenon. In developed economies,
corporations are self—perpetuating enterprises that rarely rely on equity injections from
the household sector but generate most of their equity capital internally.
2.5. Relationship to the New View
Propositions 1 and 2 complement the new view of corporate taxation. They confirm this
view for Phase HI and they show that this phase will indeed be reached. In Phase III,
profit retentions are a potential marginal source of finance and the profit from marginal
investment projects is paid out as dividends. As predicted by holders of the new view,
the marginal product of capital equals the market rate of interest.
There is less agreement, though, for Phases I and II. As is well—known, the
King—Fullerton formula says that, when there is only a dividend tax, the cost of capital
is r for a firm that relies exclusively on retained profits, and r/E)forone that relies
exclusively on new issues of shares, to finance its marginal investment projects. By way
of contrast, in Phase II, where retained profits are the only marginal source of finance,
Cf. Sinu (1987, pp. 197—200) for short review of tax rules applying to international
capital income flows.
6Calcuiated from Survey of Current Business, Volumes 57 (July 1977, p. 24 n.), 61(1981,
special supplement, p. 10), 63 (July 1983, p. 30), 66 (July 1986, p. 33); and Federal
Reserve Bulletin, Volumes 55 (November 1969, p. A 71.4), 60 (October 1974, p. A 59.4),
64 (June 1978, p. 433), 65 (December 1979, p. A 44).16
the cost of capital exceeds r. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, the cost of capital is
not, in general, equal to rAE) when new share issues are the only marginal source of
finance (Phase I). In fact, under mild conditions, it can be proved to be higher than this
value. It therefore seems that the King—Fullerton formula underestimates the cost of
equity finance for immature firms which are in Phases I or II.
As mentioned in the introduction, the reason for this divergence is the
reinvestment of profits generated by marginal investment projects. The King—Fullerton
formula is based on the assumption that marginal profits are distributed to shareholders
regardless of the marginal source of finance. This assumption is harmless for mature
firms whose marginal product equals the market rate of interest. Even if these firms
retain their marginal profits, the cost of capital can be calculated as if the profits were
distributed since the shareholders are indifferent between dividends and retentions.
Retentions generate a present value of future dividends that just equals the value of the
dividends foregone. Things are different, though, for young firms that have investment
projects yielding a gross rate of return above the market rate of interest. For these firms
retentions dominate dividends strictly and so it does make a difference whether the
reti.irns from marginal investment projects are retained or distributed. In fact, the
reinvestment of profits reduces q, the marginal value of equity, and this reduction is a
capital loss which increases the firm's cost of capital beyond the value which simple
arbitrage conditions are able to predict.'
Auseful study in the firm's cost of equity capital that also allows for a
change in q is that of Edwards and Keen (1984). These authors calculate cost of capital
formulae for situations where adjacent periods are characterized by different
combinations of new share issues and retained profits. However, they do not allow for a
phase of internal growth, and, except for Phase HI, their formulae are not applicable to
'This does not mean that the value of equity itself is being reduced. It follows from (1)
that, during Phase II where D =Q = 0,(thz+m)/M =Af/M=r.Thus, the market
value of equity grows at a rate that equals the market rate of interest. The co—state
variable q is the slope of a concave curve in (M, K) space that depicts the market value
of the firm as a function of its stock of equity capital. During Phase II, there is an
upward movement along this curve that comes to a halt where the slope equals 0.17
the present model. Their result (p. 214) that the dividend tax does not affect the cost of
capital "whenever the marginal source of funds is the same in two adjacent periods"
cannot be confirmed. During Phase II, retained profits are the marginal source of finance
in all adjacent "periods", but nevertheless the dividend tax is able to drive a wedge
between the marginal product of capital and the market rate of interest. The cited
statement is only true in Phase III where retained profits are a potential marginal source
of finance anddividendsare paid.
The possibility of, and preference for, generating equity capital through
profit retentions reduces the need for equity injections when the firm is founded and
eliminates this need thereafter. It implies an extended period of internal growth during
which the cost of capital is higher than the Edwards—Keen and King—Fullerton formulae
predict, but it also implies that the firm will eventually reach a stage of maturity where
the cost of capital is lower than Harberger assumed.
3. The Harberger Problem
3.1. Harberger's Own Anal ysi3
Consider now the Harberger problem more closely. Suppose there are two sectors, X and
Y, competing for a given aggregate stock of capital K:
(18) .=K1+K =const.
X is the corporate and Y the non—corporate sector. The two sectors produce the same
commodity by using their sector—specific production functions f()andf(',). Aggregate
output is f1(K1) +f(K).18
Assume that, before tj, there was only a non—corporate sector, but at t1 the
corporate sector is "invented". One may think of the corporation as a new form of
organizing a firm which increases the efficiency of production and induces the
government to impose a dividend tax in order to participate in the rents this form can be
expected to generate. Let f1 () be the new production fwiction available to the corpora
firm. An efficient allocation of capital to the two sectors which maximizes Y, given K, is
characterized by equality in the marginal products of capital for all points in real time
after the corporate firm has been invented (t> ti):
f,(K1)=f1(K) (efficiency).
The question is whether and when this condition will be violated in the presence of a tax
on corporate distributions.
Harberger's (1966) model is based on the implicit assumption that capital
invested in the corporate sector satisfies the condition
ef11(K1) =
andcapital invested in the non—corporate sector the condition
(19) f.('K) =r
sothat, in a capital market equilibrium,
ef(K1) =f,(K) (Harberger).
This means that a constant wedge the size iisbeing driven between the two marginal
products of capital and that there is a permanent welfare loss in terms of a reduced level
of output.19
Figure 2: The Harberger model
f(K)
Figure 2 illustrates the Harberger equilibrium. The downward and upward
sloping curves are the marginal product curves of the two sectors. The employment of
capital in the corporate sector is measured from left to right and in the non—corporate
sector from right to left. The distance between the two verticals is the total amount of
capital, K, that is available. The stock of capital is optimally allocated to the two
sectors when K1 =DFand K =FG,for then aggregate output, the area under the two
curves, is maximized. However, the allocation Harberger believed to result from the
dividend tax is characterized by=DEand K =EG,for this allocation implies that
the marginal product of capital in the corporate sector exceeds that in the non—coporate
sector by an amount sufficient to compensate for the tax discrimination against
corporate investment. Obviously, non—corporate output exceeds its optimum level by the
amount CBFE, but this is overcompensated by a comparative output loss of size ABFE
in the corporate sector. The net output loss of both sectors together is measured by the
1'
K —I I K
K20
Harberger triangle ABC, and this triangle persists for as long as the dividend taxis
levied.
The model set up in the last section is not compatible with this result. To
see this, only a few steps are necessary.
3.2. Another View of the Harberger Problem
Notice first that the decision problem of the non—corporate firm can be seen as a special
case of that model where 0= 1. The terminology simply has to be changed in an obvious
way from a corporate to a non—corporate firm and the constraintsD ￿ 0 and Q￿0,
which, because of (6), (9), and (10), cannot be binding anyway, have to be removed. As
revealed by (5) and (8) for the case '1'D= 0,the amount of capital employed by the
non—corporate sector will always satisfy (19), and because of (18), the equilibrium level
of the market rate of interest is given by
(20) r=f('K—K1).
The decision problem of the corporate firm was formulated for the case of
an arbitrarily given time path of the market rate of interest r, but the phase diagram of
Figure 1 was analyzed assuming a constant rate of interest. Thus the next step required
is to generalize the discussion of this diagram to the case where the market rate of
interest is endogenously determined by (20).
When r is endogenous, nearly everything that has been said concerning
Phase I and Phase Ill stays valid. In particular, it will still be true that q =1in Phase I
and q =e inPhase III. Again, Phase Tb cannot exist. On the one hand, Q>0,D> 0,
Note that the time path of r is endogenous to the equilibrium, but not to the firm's
planning problem. The firm is assumed to be a price taker. It is not assumed that it has
market power and thus believes that it can affect the time path of the market rate of
interest through its own actions.21
and (20) imply that>0and 1 =— f'K1 >0.On the other hand, (13) and i> ü
indicate that=i/f"<0, a clear contradiction. The only important addition to the
previous analysis is that the steady state stock of capital, call it now K1, that was
previously determined by (16), is now implicitly given by
f11(K1) =f,1(K-K1).
There are minor changes with the possible paths during Phase II as defined by (14) and
(15). Instead of (17), the slope of a path is now given by
dq/K1 =qLf,1(K- K1) -f1'(K1)]/f1(K1).
This equation reveals that the paths are more strongly curved than in the case of a
constant r,butclearly none of the qualitative properties described in the previous
section change. Thus Figure 1 and Propositions 1 and 2 stay perfectly valid, It is only
necessary to keep in mind that the market rate of interest can be identified with the
marginal product of capital in the non—corporate sector.
Figure 3 illustrates the intertemporal market equilibrium in a diagram that
combines Figures 1 and 2. In the beginning, there is no corporate sector so that the total
amount of capital DG is invested by non—corporate firms. Then, at t1, the corporate
sector defined by the new marginal product curve f' and the dividend tax factor E) come
into existence. By issuing shares the corporate sector will immediately withdraw the
amount of capital DE from the non—corporate sector and bid up the interest rate from
HD to CE. The withdrawal is less than is required by efficiency and implies that there is
a Harberger triangle of size ABC. However, the welfare loss is only temporary. With the
passage of time, the corporate sector will build up equity capital through profit
retentions and claim a growing proportion of the economy's available stock of real assets.
This improves the allocation of resources to the two sectors and increases aggregate
output. The process comes to a halt when the Harberger triangle has vanished, theK1 K1
Figure 3: The vanishing Harberger triangle
corporate stock of capital has increased to DF, and the non—corporatestock has fallen to
FG. The economy is then in an efficient steady state where its output is maximized
given the available stock of capital and where the profits aredistributed to the
household sector. The following proposition summarizes this conclusion.
Proposition 3: Initially, when the corporate sector 3 young and reinvests its profits,there
is a Harberger triangle. Yet, this triangle gradually vanishes with the passage of time and
aggregate output increases. In finite time, the economy reaches a stage of maturitywhere
the corporate sector distributes its earnings and the available stock of capital is being










3.3. The Correlation between Dividend Taxes and the Distortion.s they Cause
There is a final proposition generated by the model which follows directly from the
observation that no dividends, and hence no dividend taxes, are paid during the
adjustment to the steady state.
Proposition 4:Thedividend tax distorts the intersectoral allocation of resources when it is
not paid and it is neutral when it is paid.
The payment of dividend taxes signals that the firm is in a stage of maturity where the
new view of corporate taxation holds and where the dividend tax no longer affects the
investment decisions. The burden of the tax is capitalized in share prices, and there is no
way for the corporate sector to reduce this burden by changing its investment policy. By
way of contrast, corporations which do not pay dividend taxes signal that they are in
need of equity capital and have not yet reached the stage of niturity and efficiency. The
point is simply that dividend taxes create distortions before they are paid. The threat of
dividend taxes that will have to be paid in the future makes shareholders reluctant to
inject more than a nucleus of equity capital into their firms. However, when these taxes
are actually paid, the process of reinvesting profits must have generated enough equity
to compensate for this threat and to eliminate the Harberger triangle. In any given
period of time, there is a negative correlation between the size of the tax burden and the
magnitude of the Harberger triangle.
4.Extensionsand Qualifications
The previous discussion referred only to a single tax and to the case of founding the
corporate sector as a whole. It was also based on an extreme version of the trapped
equity view. This section comments on possible extensions, generalizations, and
qualifications.24
4.1. Disturbance3with anExisting Corporate Sector
One obvious extension is to think of an initial steady state equilibriumwith an existing
corporate sector that is disturbed by newand unforeseen inventions which shift this
sector's marginal product curve upward. This case canbe captured with the formal
approach derived above by changing the initial conditionof problem (4) from K0 =0to
K0> 0. This would not affect the time paths depictedin Figures 1 and 3 but would
simply imply that the economy starts at a later stage onthese paths. Suppose, the new
marginal product curve after the invention is the oneillustrated in Figure 3 and the old
curve intersected the marginal product curveof the non—corporate sector to the left of
point C. In this case, the corporate sector issues newshares at the time the invention
occurs and jumps immediately to point C. After this,there is again the finite period of
internal growth ending with the stage of maturity, B, wheredividends are paid. And
once again the dividend tax retards the adjustment processtowards an efficient
equilibrium, but does not prevent this equilibrium from beingeventually reached.
Instead of the initial equilibrium being located to the left of pointC in
Figure 3, it might also have been to the right ofthis point. In this case, the corporate
sector will not react to the inventions by issuing new sharesbut will merely stop paying
dividends to its shareholders, entering a period of internal growth which eventuallyleads
to the stage of efficiency and maturity.
4.2. Escapes from the Equity Trap
Another extension would be to relax the constraint that dividends are the only wayof
distributing cash to shareholders. This constraint is certainly notrealistic as most
countries allow for a tax—exempt return of original capital. If such return were permitted
to replace or precede dividend payments, the firm's optimal growth pathwould be
strongly affected. However, the typical provision —onethat definitely applies in the
United States, for example —isthat a return of capital cannot occur before current25
profits and all accumulated reserves have been paid out. Formally, thepossibility of
returning the original capital afterdistributingthe reserves and profits implies that the
constraint Q￿0 of problem (4) is removed for K ￿ K1 and maintained for K>K1
where K1 is the original capital (see Figures 1 and. 3). As thismeans that a flow
constraint is removed for values of the state variable (K) where it is notbinding (q ￿ 1),
and retained where it is (q <1),the firm's optimal growth path and all of the
conclusions based on it would remain unaffected.
Cash payments to shareholders that would undermine bothHarberger's
results and those derived in this paper are profit financed sharerepurchases and
acquitisions. Share purchases by corporations that are financed out of past andpresent
profits largely avoid the double taxation of dividends and indicate a loophole in the
classical and partial imputation systems of capital income taxation. Mostcountries have
effectively closed this loophole by declaring share repurchases illegal. However, in the
United States the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, Section 302 of theInternal
Revenue Code prohibits firms to repurchase shares in lieu of dividendpayments. On the
other hand, share purchases by corporations have recently increaseddramatically,
constituting a large fraction of corporate cash distributions. A very extensive record of
this phenomenon is provided by Shoven (1986).9 He showed that, since1984, the volume
of corporate share purchases, predominantly acquisitions, exceededordinary dividend
payments, yet he also found that the share purchases did not simply replace the
dividends but reflected a leverage phenomenon. Quite remarkably, the timepath of
dividends was unaffected by the rising repurchase volume and debt rather thanprofits
seemed to have been the source of the additional cash that shareholdersreceived.'0
Whether and to what extent the recent increase in corporate sharepurchases can be seen
Cf. also Poterba (1987, p. 471) and Bagwell/Shoven (1988).
'05eeSinn(1987, di. 6) for a formal analysis of the advantages of profit and debt
financed acquisitions.26
as a use for profits from marginal investment projectsthat eliminates Harberger type
distortions remains to be seen.
4.3. Other Tazes
Further modifications would involve a richer set of taxes. It wouldbe space consuming,
but easy, to introduce personal income taxes on dividends and interest income,personal
capital gains taxes, and a corporate tax on retainedand distributed profits. This
extension could change the nature of the steady state, as therecould be a persistent
Harberger triangle resulting from a difference between thecombined marginal corporate
and capital gains tax burden on retained profits on the one hand andthe shareholders'
marginal personal tax burden on interest income on theother. However, under the
classical system of capital income taxation, the basic adjustment pattern described,
including the initial share issues, the phase of internal growth,and the shrinking
Harberger triangle, would still show up. Moreover, the steady statesize of the triangle
would continue to be smaller than Harberger believed it to be.t' The driving forcebehind
the results of this paper is a comparatively high tax burden on corporatedividends
which exceeds both the burden on personal interest income and that on retained profits.
Because of an unmitigated double taxation of distributed profits and a limited taxation
of accrued capital gains this force is fully operative in real tax systems of the classical
type which are, for example, employed in the United States, Switzerland,and Australia.
The present model should have some relevance for these economies although it assumes
that the dividend tax is the only tax in the economy.
"A discussion of the steady state properties of the present model in the presence of
richer tax structures can be found in Sian (1987, ch. 6).27
5.Conclusion
In one sense, the results of this paper confirm Harberger, in another they contradict him.
It is certainly true that the high tax burden on corporate dividends creates efficiency
losses as Harberger claimed. This burden is an obstacle to the foundation of firms and
prevents capital from being used in the corporate sector although it could usefully be
employed there. After a corporation has been founded with a nucleus of external equity
capital, there is a phase of internal growth where retentions are the only marginal source
of finance. During this phase, the intersectoral distortions are higher than those the cost
of capital formulae used by holders of the new view of corporate taxation predict. It is
not correct to weight the influence of dividend taxes with the proportion of investment
financed by new share issues and it is not true that dividend taxes are neutral when
firms generate their equity capital through profit retentions. There is a Harberger
triangle when all profits are retained in consecutive periods and no shares are issued.
On the other hand, dividend taxes will not create permanent distortions in
the allocation of capital but merely retard the speed with which an efficient allocation is
reached. One lesson of the model is that the intersectoral distortions which Harberger
claimed to result from the dividend tax are transitory phenomena that may have been
important in early stages of the development of the corporate secter, but vanish when
the economy matures.
In a mature economy, corporations distribute dividends to their
shareholders. Firms that distribute dividends can always generate more equity capital by
stopping the distributions. These firms are therefore in the situation which the new view
of corporate taxation concentrates on. Their marginal cost of equity capital is the
market rate of interest and they follow the same investment rules as their non—corporate
competitors.
A stage of full maturity is conceivable for a world with one representative
firm, and in some real economies it may have been reached to a high degree of
approximation. In general, however, account must be taken of the facts that there are
always new entrants into the corporate sector and that new investment opportunities28
show up for existing firms. These facts imply a continuing incentive toissue new shares.
The model developed has immediate implications for this case. One such implicationis
that the size of the dividend tax rate will have a negative impact on the entrants'
starting stocks of equity and the incumbents' share issues after inventions.The tax will
therefore adversely affect corporate investment. Perhaps this is the explanation for the
empirical result of Poterba and Summers that was cited in the introduction.
If the explanation is correct, it follows that dividend taxation impedes
investment not only at the point in time where new shares are issued, but also inthe
period of internal growth that follows and, in fact, the distortionwill be larger, the
longer this period. A corollary of this result is that the overall distortionin the economy
will be larger, the larger the proportion of investment that is financed with retained
profits rather than with newly issued shares. This corollary is contrary towhat the
weighted average formulations of the cost of capital predict.
Harberger's empirical estimates of the intersectoral distortions created by
the existing capital income taxes are strongly affected by these considerations. Unlike
Poterba and Summers, Harberger and many of his followers did not focus on statutory
tax rates but based their welfare estimates on "effective tax rates" defined as a sector's
ratio of total capital income tax liability and total volume of capital income per unit of
time. With a classical system of capital income taxation, where the overall tax burden
on dividends exceeds that on retained profits, this means that the measured we1f.re loss
will be higher, the higher the proportion of profits paid out as dividends, for the higher
this proportion, the higher is the measured value of the effective tax rate.
If the spirit of the model presented in this paper is correct, this method of
estimating the welfare loss stands the truth on its head. Given the tax law, a high
effective tax rate for the corporate sector signals, among other things, that many
corporations are mature and pay dividends; and a low effective tax rate —onethat
approximates the tax rate of the non—corporate sector —signalsthat many corporations
are in the transitory period of rapid internal growth. A high tax rate therefore signals
small, and a low tax rate large, intersectoral distortions or, to put it another way, the29
true intersectoral distortions are smaller, the larger the distortions that Harberger
estimated. The Harberger triangle has not vanished, what has vanished is the idea that
the triangle and the visible tax burden take the stage together.
Appendix
By studying the functional form of the Phase—IT paths, this appendix
i) proves that the ordinate is an asymptote for all possible paths and
ii)derives a sufficient condition for Phase II to start with a capital stock lower than
that which follows from Harberger's formula or, equivalently, a sufficient condition
for the cost of capital associated with new share issues to be higher than
Harberger's formula implies.
The proofs apply to the general model of section 2 where r is endogenous. The constant
value of r assumed in section 1 is a special case of this.
The Functional Form of the Phase—lI Path
Let q(K1) be a function that describes the Phase—il path in (q,K1) space
(see Figures 1 and 3) and let j denote the production elasticity of capital employed in
sector i, assuming that this elasticity is bounded away from unity:
(Al) 1(K) f1'(Kj)KVf(Ki); i =X,Y <1.
From (15), the time derivative of q is
=q =q'(K1)f1 (K1).
Inserting this into (14) and using (20) to explain r endogenously, one obtains30
A2)
q'(K1)f'(K-K1)f1(K1)










Notice that, as f (K—u) < for u < K, the integral in (A4) is finite for all K1 < K if
1K1 1/f1(u) du < for K1 ￿ 0. As 1/f1('u) —' for u —,0,this condition is non—trivial.
It resnits from the assumption thatis bounded away from unity as Kapproacheszero.
With as the upper bound on 3, a positive constant 5 exists such that f1(u)> uU/o for
all u below some arbitrarily small constant E, E > 0. It follows that
fl/f1(u)du < f 5udu =
u1]
=E1<
which clearly implies that f 1/f1(u) du <for all K1￿ 0.
i) The Limiting Value of q
It is obvious from (A3) and (A4) that q(K1) —forK1
—'0if it is recalled that, by
assumption, f1 (K1)
—.+0for K1—.0and if one realizes that(K1)
—,1for K1—0.31
ii) The Stock of Origir&alCapital
Let
(A5) qM(K1) &'(K1)e/f,'(K_K1)
be the value of q implicit in the Harberger approach and let KM be the size of the
corporate stock of capital where qM =1;i.e., the size Harberger believed to result from
dividend taxation. The goal is to find sufficient conditions for
(A6) KM>K1
or, equivalently, for
(A7) q(K) < qM(K5).
As K is defined by f1'(K12 =f(K—K1)and as q(K12) =(3,it follows from (A5) that
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Using (A2) and (A5), this inequality can be transformed to
f'f'ff
or, after a few manipulations and using (Al), to
(A8) iLK fy
11' 1f' KP1f'32
To interpret condition (A8), it is useful to hypothesize that the pure profit
or rent which the concave functions f1 and f imply are the returnsfrom a hidden second
factor of production. Let a(Kj,), i =X,Y, denote the Hicksian substitution elasticity
between capital and the hidden factor in sector i assuming that the production functions
are linearly homogenous. It is a standard result that (A8) can then be written as:
1— 1_K 1____ (A9) +
K,,f
Note that, by the definition of KX,
fx,-f;<TforK￿K<K — I X2
JI
This implies that it is sufficient for (A9) and hence for (A6) to hold if
1- 1- K
(Alo) I+ >1T r.. K
This condition captures the case of a constant rate of interest in the limiting case of a
small corporate sector where IC1IK —0.With a Cobb—Douglas technology (a =1)the
condition would then require that the implicit current tax burden on the normal return
to equity does not eliminate the pure corporate rent (i < 1—P1). With < 1 and/or a
"large" corporate sector (R1/K> 0), (AlO) would be satisfied even under weaker
conditions.33
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